Despite the strategic platform of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ meeting, the much-anticipated bilateral engagement between Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, on Thursday appears to have done little to meaningfully resolve the long-standing and complex border dispute between India and China.
The meeting, held in Qingdao, offered India yet another opportunity to push for permanent disengagement and de-escalation, but once again, concrete outcomes were notably absent.
For the first time, India explicitly emphasised the need for a “structured roadmap of permanent engagement and de-escalation”—a significant shift from the previously repeated diplomatic phrases of “confidence-building” and “maintaining tranquillity.”
Yet, the Chinese side offered no new commitments, no timelines, and no signs of willingness to move beyond the ambiguous diplomatic language that has defined and stalled negotiations since the deadly 2020 Galwan clash.
In its official statement, India’s Ministry of Defence noted that Rajnath Singh raised the issue of the trust deficit created post-2020, when Chinese troops breached Line of Actual Control (LAC) norms and triggered a military standoff that persists to this day in several sectors, including eastern Ladakh.
Singh reportedly urged concrete steps to restore trust through action on the ground, but once again, the Chinese delegation offered only general assurances and not a single specific roadmap to final settlement.
Even as both sides agreed to continue consultations through existing mechanisms, Indian officials remain deeply frustrated by the lack of real progress.
The dialogue process itself has become increasingly procedural and symbolic, rather than solution-oriented. Multiple rounds of talks and four bilateral meetings since 2020—Moscow, New Delhi, Vientiane, and now Qingdao—have yet to yield full disengagement, let alone actual de-escalation or border demarcation.
Rajnath Singh also stressed the importance of creating “good neighbourly conditions” for cooperation and regional stability.
But in the face of China’s continued military build-up along the LAC and its refusal to restore status quo ante positions, such calls appear increasingly one-sided. India continues to uphold peace and dialogue, while China dodges hard commitments, undermining the very framework of trust that these meetings aim to build.
The Indian side also raised the symbolic milestone of 75 years of diplomatic relations and welcomed the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, but these gestures do little to offset the core reality:
China remains non-committal on resolving the central issue of border demarcation, leaving India to deal with ambiguity, unpredictability, and periodic flare-ups.
Singh also briefed Admiral Dong on the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam and India’s subsequent Operation Sindoor, targeting cross-border terrorism.
However, there was no indication of a Chinese condemnation or expression of solidarity, further underscoring the asymmetry in the bilateral engagement.
In contrast, Singh’s bilateral with Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov was marked by direct discussions and practical defence cooperation, including the supply of S-400 air defence systems, upgrades to Su-30 MKIs, and joint production initiatives.
The Russian side explicitly condemned the Pahalgam attack and reaffirmed Indo-Russian defence ties, underlining the difference in sincerity and responsiveness compared to China.
Singh also held productive discussions with the Defence Ministers of Belarus, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, focusing on military technical cooperation, training, and capacity building—areas where India has made tangible advances.
Yet, the crucial engagement with China, arguably the most geopolitically sensitive, ended with more rhetoric than resolution.
The India-China defence dialogue continues to be a diplomatic treadmill, where progress is discussed but rarely achieved. India’s renewed push for a permanent resolution highlights its growing impatience, but until China commits to real action, the bilateral meetings risk becoming exercises in managed stalemate, rather than steps toward lasting peace.