The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed on September 19, 1960, between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan, has once again become the focal point of India’s political debate.
With India suspending the treaty in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack, BJP national president J.P. Nadda has revived old criticisms, calling it “one of Nehru’s biggest blunders.”
More than six decades later, the arguments voiced in Parliament then, and echoed now, make the treaty appear less like a settled question of water-sharing and more like a contested legacy of national interest versus peace-building.
Nadda’s Charge: “Nehru Sacrificed National Interest”
Nadda minced no words in his attack.
- “Nehru signed the treaty without consulting Parliament, unilaterally giving away 80% of Indus basin waters to Pakistan.”
- “When Parliament finally discussed it, the debate lasted barely two hours. This was not statesmanship, it was negligence.”
- “The treaty permanently compromised India’s water security in exchange for the illusion of goodwill.”
For Nadda, the IWT is not an isolated mistake, but part of a pattern: lofty idealism, disregard for Parliament, and a willingness to prioritise global image over hard national interest.
Opposition in 1960: Vajpayee and Others Raised Red Flags
History appears to bolster Nadda’s stance. In the November 1960 debate, several MPs voiced apprehensions:
- Atal Bihari Vajpayee (Jana Sangh): Warned that India had “bartered away its rights in the hope that Pakistan would treat us kindly,” questioning whether the World Bank could ever “guarantee Pakistan’s goodwill.”
- Sardar Iqbal Singh (Akali Dal, Punjab): Expressed Punjab’s deep concerns, saying “the farmers who depend on these waters may face insecurity.”
- Asoka Mehta (PSP): Pointed to the “heavy financial burden” India would bear, cautioning against “too much sentimentalism in these matters.”
- Brijraj Singh (Swatantra Party): Asserted that “peace cannot be bought by surrender,” urging the government to take farmers’ fears seriously.
These voices, long forgotten, seem prophetic today as Pakistan continues to weaponise terror while benefiting from the treaty.
Nehru’s Defence: “Better an Imperfect Peace Than Endless Conflict”
Nehru, however, passionately defended the IWT, framing it as a practical compromise rather than a surrender.
- “I am not at all satisfied with this treaty… I should have liked it to be different. But agreements are arrived at by mutual consent, not by one party imposing its will.”
- “We could have continued quarrelling indefinitely, but that would have been disastrous for both countries.”
- “We are not giving away our waters; we are using them in a planned way while ensuring peace and goodwill.”
To Nehru, the treaty was not about weakness but about preventing perpetual disputes. It represented, in his words, a chance to “turn a new page” in relations with Pakistan, even if imperfect.
Congress Leaders Backed Him Too
Other Congress leaders defended the treaty as a pragmatic achievement:
- Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim (Irrigation Minister): “This is not a gift to Pakistan. They will have to spend hundreds of crores to utilise what has been allocated.”
- A.C. Guha: Called objections “mostly theoretical” and hailed Nehru’s “vision in ending a long-standing quarrel.”
- Kalika Singh: Said the government had shown “courage to finalise a matter hanging fire for 13 years.”
- B.C. Mathur: Declared it “not an act of charity” but a balanced arrangement.
For them, the treaty symbolised certainty over uncertainty, settlement over endless strife.
The Debate That Still Echoes Today
The Indus Waters Treaty thus remains suspended between two narratives:
- For critics like Nadda and Vajpayee, it was a historic blunder—a one-sided concession that weakened India strategically and left its farmers anxious.
- For Nehru and his supporters, it was an act of statesmanship—a pragmatic, if imperfect, compromise that avoided decades of hydropolitical conflict.
As India faces repeated acts of cross-border terrorism, the treaty is increasingly judged through the lens of security rather than peace.
The questions raised in 1960 continue to echo in 2025: Was Nehru naïve, or was he farsighted? Did India secure stability, or surrender leverage?
And should the treaty, long hailed abroad as a model of cooperation, now be consigned to history?
#IndusWatersTreaty #NehruVsNadda #HistoricDebate #WaterSecurity #IndiaPakistan #BJP #NationalInterest #AtalBihariVajpayee #JawaharlalNehru #Geopolitics